ACN - 101321555 Australasian Human Research Ethics Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (AHRECS)

Research Ethics MonthlyAbout Us

Australasian Human Research Ethics Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (AHRECS)

Complainant anonymity in misconduct proceedings depends on the forum

 


Prof. Colin Thomson AM, Senior Consultant, AHRECS

This news item, while identifying the fact that the decision relates to court proceedings and not to university processes, leaves out some informative facts.

Two members of the La Trobe academic staff lodged complaints about bullying by Professor Keyzer, whom the university suspended.  In turn, Professor Keyzer commenced proceedings against the university in the Federal Court to challenge the way it had handled the complaint. The complainants were not parties in these proceedings.  However, they sought to intervene in the case (Keyzer v La Trobe University [2019] FCA 646) to request that the court order that their names not be published.  They were represented at the hearing but both the university and Professor Keyzer were not.

The court needed to decide whether to allow the complainants to intervene in the case and, if they were allowed, whether there was a case to suppress their names in the court hearing and record.  The court allowed them to intervene but did not order suppression of their names.

The question of suppression of the complainants’ names raised, and was ultimately decided on, the fundamental difference between proceedings in institutional investigations and those in superior courts.  That difference is that publicity of court proceedings is seen to be central to the administration of justice in Australia, and characteristic of the English common law tradition that informs Australian court proceedings.

In concluding his comprehensive judgement, that contains a thorough account of the open justice principle at stake and the exceptions that have been permitted, Anastassiou J said:

I echo the sympathy expressed by Mahoney JA for the “great pain” that is often felt by those subjected to publicity surrounding court proceedings. However, the power conferred by s 37AF is constrained by the grounds under s 37AG and by the overlay of priority to be given to the public interest served by open justice pursuant to s 37AE. In my view, s 37AG(1)(a) makes clear that the public interest served by open justice may only be qualified where it is necessary in the strictest sense to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The legitimate personal interest of the interveners in maintaining their privacy in connection with the complaints process is not sufficient to conclude that the protection of their interests is necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.

The following is the text of sections referred to:

37AE  Safeguarding public interest in open justice

In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice.

37AF  Power to make orders

(1)  The Court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order, on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:

    • information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in a proceeding before the Court; or

(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:

(i)   information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or

(ii)   information obtained by the process of discovery; or

(iii)   information produced under a subpoena; or

(iv)   information lodged with or filed in the Court.

(2)  The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).

37AG  Grounds for making an order

(1)  The Court may make a suppression order or non-publication order, on one or more of the following grounds:

(a)  the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice;

(b)  the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security;

(c)  the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person;

(d)  the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to  a party  to or witness in a criminal proceeding involving an offence of a sexual nature (including an act of indecency).

(2)  A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made.

Concluding observation

Within the scope of a university’s own investigation or disciplinary procedures, the assurance of confidentiality in internal procedures and policies can be relied upon. However, when proceedings in relation to staff misconduct are brought in an Australian superior court, such as the Federal Court or a State Supreme Court, the priorities among principles changes. In those courts, the principle of preserving the “proper administration of justice” is fundamental and has priority over the principles that governed the conduct of institutional proceedings. In such courts, the grounds on which exceptions can be made to that principle, such as orders that suppress the name of a person, as this case illustrates, are few.

This post may be cited as:
Thomson, C. (24  May 2019) Complainant anonymity in misconduct proceedings depends on the forum. Research Ethics Monthly. Retrieved from: https://ahrecs.com/research-integrity/complainant-anonymity-in-misconduct-proceedings-depends-on-the-forum



Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

captcha

Please enter the CAPTCHA text

0